[科学哲学自学资料]PS8-波普的证伪主义.pptVIP

第八讲：波普的证伪主义 24.1 Introduction 24.2 Humes Problem of Induction 24.3 Poppers Falsificationism 24.4 Demarcation of Science 24.5 Falsifiability 24.6 Path of Science 24.8 Corroboration, Verisimilitude, and Hume 第八讲：波普的证伪主义 24.1 Introduction Karl R. Popper (1902-1994) was a charismatic writer and speaker on the philosophy of science and attracted many followers. Compared to Historicist like Kuhn and Feyerabend, he belongs to Logicism, but not a Logical Positivist, though educated in University of Vienna. “Who killed Logical Positivism? …. I did it.” Popper is not interested in 1) theory of meaning; 2) the structure of scientific theory, the reduction project; 3) The logic of Induction. Popper criticized Logical Positivism in (1) Scientific statements can be falsified but not verified. (This prompted the logical positivists to replace their verification principle of meaning with their testability principle of meaningfulness). (2) Metaphysical statements, though nonscientific, play an important role in the development of scientific theories and are certainly not meaningless. (The logical positivists have since shown more respect for metaphysics). (3) Subjective experience can never justify a scientific statement, and statements that describe our experiences do not enjoy favored status in science. (This contribute to the replacement of phenomenalism by physicalism.). 第八讲：波普的证伪主义 24.1 Introduction The similarities between Popper and Vienna Circle: (1) Observational statements play the decisive role in the acceptability of theories (Poppers basic statements correspond to logical positivists (physicalistic) observational statements. Popper makes it clear that basic statements are not about experience but about physical things)Hence. Poppers philosophy is firmly empiricist. (2) Humes problem of induction is genuine and requires serious attention. (3) The context of discovery and that of justification are distinct issues and should be studied separately. Therefore, there