经理股票期权的经济学根源探析.pdfVIP

24 1 Vol. 24 No. 1 2 0 0 4 3 JOURNAL OF LIAONING UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY Mar. 2004 : 1 72- 952(2004) 01- 0085- 03 1 2 1 3 翟庆国, 杨玉文 , 李 剑, 曹玉梅 ( 1. , 113001; 2. , 11 00; 3. , 473000) : 经理股票期权的盛行有其经济学根源首先, 现代企业是人力资本与非人力资本的 一个特 的契 约, 人力资本的所有者有权分享企业剩余, 经理股票期权激励机制突出了人力资本的价值其次, 所有权与经营权 分离后, 企业不可避免的面对由于信息不对称导致的委托- 代理问题, 经理股票期权给予经理人分享企业剩余的权 利, 从而将委托人的利益与代理人的利益联系起来, 很好地解决了委托- 代理矛盾通过这两 个方面的论述, 阐明 了经理股票期权激励机制产生的理论基础, 为理解经理股票期权的涵义及在中国实际的运用作了必要的铺垫 : 经理股票期权; 人力资本; 委托代理 : F244 : A Discussion on the Economics Background of Executive Stock Option 1 2 1 3 ZHAI Qing- guo , YANG Yu- wen , LI Jian , CAO Yu- mei (1. School of Economic Management, Liaoning University of Petroleum Chemical Technology, Fushun Liaoning 113001, China; 2. Economics and Management ep artment, alian Nationalities University , alian Liaoning 11 00, China; 3.H enan Petroleum Exp loration Bureau, Wuyi Community Labor and Cop ital Branch, Nanyang Henan 473000, China) Abstract: The t heoretical background of executive stock option ( ESO) is economics. First, modern enterprises are an integration of human capital and non- human capital. Human capital has the right to participate in t he allocation of the residual of a firm. Second, w ith the separation of ownership and management, the principal agent problems exist. Because of the asymmetry of information, it becomes difficult for the owners to monitor the activities of managers. With ESO, the managers become residual claimers of the firm. T he owners and t he managers become to have common interest. In this paper, a depth discussion of the economic background of E