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Journal of Economic Behavior Organization 90S (2013) S57–S75 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Journal of Economic Behavior Organization j o u r na l h o m e p a g e : w w w . el sevier.c om/ locate /jeb o Information, irrationality, and the evolution of trust Michael L. Manapat a,b,c,∗ , Martin A. Nowak a,b,c,d , David G. Rand a,c,e a Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA b School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 29 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA c Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, 1 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA d Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, 26 Oxford Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA e Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Trust is a central component of social and economic interactions among humans. While Received 19 July 2012 rational self-interest dictates that “investors” should not be trusting and “trustees” should Received in revised form 18 October 2012 not be trustworthy in one-shot anonymous interactions, behavioral experiments with Accepted 30 October 2012 the “trust game” have found that people are both. Here we show how an evolutionary Available online 8 November 2012 framework can explain this seemingly irrational, altruistic behavior. When individuals’