股权结构与公司价值：新的证据来自西班牙的公司治理制度外文翻译.doc

外文翻译 Ownership Structure and Firm Value: New Evidence from the Spanish Corporate Governance System Material Source:/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=393464 Author：Alberto de Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre Theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance was originally motivated by the separation of ownership from control (Berle and Means, 1932) and, more recently, by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The common premise in past studies is that managers and owners have divergent interests. Specifically, shareholders wish to maximize value while managers prefer self-interested strategies which are far from maximizing value, and in the absence of either appropriate incentives or sufficient monitoring, managers can exercise their discretion to the detriment of owners. In this context, various corporate governance mechanisms – such as ownership structure are proposed to solve this divergence-of-interest problem and to mitigate the costs associated with the conflict. Financial literature usually considers ownership structure as the main corporate governance mechanism that affects firm value. Therefore, our paper focuses on studying how ownership structure influences corporate value. As we discuss in Section II, several studies have obtained empirical evidence on the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. In particular, financial literature has paid greater attention to two relations. First, there are several papers that study the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration. These papers try to test the monitoring and expropriation hypotheses in different corporate governance systems. For instance, Hill and Snell (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) obtain evidence for US firms; the experience of UK firms is offered by Leech and Leahy (1991) and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998); the case of Japanese firms is studied by Kaplan and Minton (1