不完全信息，股利政策，和“一鸟在手”的谬论外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 Imperfect information, dividend policy, and the bird in the hand fallacy MaterialSource:The Bell Journal of Economic Author: Sudipto Bhattacharya This paper assumes that outside investors have imperfect information about firms profitability and that cash dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. It is shown that under these conditions, such dividends function as a signal of expected cash flows. By structuring the model so that finite-lived investors turn over continuing projects to succeeding generations of investors, we derive a comparative static result that relates the equilibrium level of dividend payout to the length of investors planning horizons. This article develops a model in which cash dividends function as a signal of expected cash flows of firms in an imperfect-information setting. We assume that the productive assets in which agents invest stay in place longer than the agents live and that ownership of the assets is transferred, over time, to other agents. The latter are a priori imperfectly informed about the profitability of assets held by different firms. The major signaling costs that lead dividends to function as signals arise because dividends are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, whereas capital gains are taxed at a lower rate. Within this framework, this paper explains why firms may pay dividends despite the tax disadvantage of doing so. Recently, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) have used the paradigm of Spences signaling model (1974) to examine financial market phenomena related to unsystematic risk borne by entrepreneurs and firm debt-equity choice decisions, respectively. In its spirit and cost structure, our model is closely related to the Ross model (1977).The essential contributions of our model are the following. First, we develop a tax-based signaling cost structure founded on the observation that signaling equilibria are feasible, even if signaling cost elements that are negatively related to true expec