基于Ramp;D溢出的集中研发联盟合作行为.pdfVIP

第29 卷 第1 期 控 制 与 决 策 2014 年 1 月 Vol. 29 No. 1 Control and Decision Jan. 2014 文章编号: 1001-0920 (2014) 01-0172-09 DOI: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2012.1378 基于RD 溢出的集中研发联盟合作行为 熊 麟, 鲁若愚 ( 电子科技大学经济与管理学院，成都610054) 摘 要: 研究了在联盟合作RD 中RD 溢出、RD 溢出的抑制能力以及创新能力对联盟成员的RD 投资策略的 影响, 确定了联盟获得最大期望投入的最优分配方式. 研究表明: 1) RD 溢出和创新能力对联盟成员增加RD 投入 有正效应; 企业抑制RD 溢出的力量对RD 投入有负效应, 但影响力很弱. 2) 对于创新能力强的联盟, 平均分配为 最优分配方式; 对于创新能力弱的联盟, 市场规模低时选择按投入比例分配方式, 市场规模高时选择平均分配方式. 关键词: RD 溢出；创新能力；合作RD ；收益分配方式 中图分类号: F016 文献标志码: A Partner’s cooperative behaviour in gathered RD alliances based on RD spillovers XIONG Lin , LU Ruo-yu (School of Management and Economics，University of Electronic Science and Technology of China ，Chengdu 610054，China ．Correspondent ：XIONG Lin ，E-mail ：xls77 1@) Abstract: This paper studies on how members of alliance’s investment policies are influenced by RD spillovers, control on own RD spillovers and innovation ability, and determines the optimal allocation that the alliances obtain the maximum expected investment. This research shows following conclusions: 1) RD spillovers and innovation ability have positive effects to increase members’ RD investment, and control on own RD spillovers has negative effects to members’ RD investment, but its influence is weak. 2) The equal profit-sharing arrangement is the optimal profit-sharing arrangement to the alliances with strong innovation ability. For alliances with weak innovation ability, it should choose proportional profit- sharing arrangement when market profits are low, and should choose equal profit-sharing arrangement when market gains are high. Key words: RD