经理人掠夺视角与薪酬合约设计 承诺价值和外部法律环境与影响.docVIP

经理人掠夺视角的薪酬合约设计：承诺价值和外部法律环境的影响 郑志刚 中国人民大学财政金融学院，北京 100872 通讯地址：中国人民大学财政金融学院 邮政编码：100872 联系电话：（0（010Email： zhengzg@sfruc.edu.cn; zhengzhig@ruc.edu.cn； 作者简介：郑志刚，经济学博士（北大光华），现任中国人民大学财政金融学院讲师。研究领域为公司治理理论、企业理论、微观经济理论等。在《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《经济学动态》、《经济学（季刊）》、《管理世界》、《经济社会体制比较》等期刊发表论文数十篇。 Compensation Contract Design from the Perspective of Management Expropriation: the Commitment Value and the Effect of Legal Investor Protection Zhigang ZHENG School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872 Abstract: The optimal contract approach, which is based on the assumption of informational asymmetry of management’s effort and complete legal investor protection, emphasizes on how to mitigate the shirking of management when designing management compensation contracts while paying no attention to the management expropriation to investor’s interest which exists currently as well as the effect of the legal protection to the design of management compensation contracts. Under a simple framework of the existence of management expropriation and legal investor protection variable introduced, this paper proves that management ex ante shareholding has the commitment value of decreasing the expropriation level of investor’s interest, and thus in some sense addresses the management compensation contract design when management expropriation exists. By further investigating the effect of legal investor protection to the design of management compensation contract, we find that external investors should allow management to hold more shares if the legal protection to investors is weak. Keywords: management expropriation, compensation contract design, commitment value, and legal investor protection. 经理人掠夺视角的薪酬合约设计：承诺价值和外部法律环境的影响 摘要：最优合约理论基于经理人努力程度信息非对称和外部法律环境完备的假设，通常围绕如何降低经理人的偷懒行为展开薪酬合约设计，既没有考虑事实存在的经理人对投资者利益的直接掠夺，也没有考虑外部法律环境对薪酬合约设计的影响。在一个存在经理人掠夺和引入法律对投资者利益保护变量的简单框架下，本文证明，经理人事先持股具有降低经理人掠夺投资者利益的承诺价值，从而在一定意义上回答了存在经理人掠夺时的经理人薪酬合约的设计问题。进一步考察外部法律环境对经理人薪酬设计的影响，我们发现，如果法律对投资者利益保护越弱