开发商CARA偏好下商品房预售固定价格合同研究.pdfVIP

开发商CARA 偏好下商品房预售的固定价格合同研究 1 2 伍海军 马永 (1 暨南大学经济学院,广东 广州 510632 2 电子科技大学管理学院,四川 成都 610054) 摘要: 依据合约理论的框架，分析了商品房预售市场与国内现实较为接近的固定价格合同，发现在开发商 保留部分商品房进行现房销售收入的条件下，固定价格合同存在激励，但是，开发商可以在合同转移支付 与现房销售收入之间建立一个收益组合，在分享合同产出的同时却没有承担相匹配的风险，造成合同激励 不足。其次，针对宏观调控问题，通过各调控变量的联合变动可以实现房价变动的目标，并借助宏观调控 函数给出了其解析解，但是，在贷款利率保持不变时，由于各调控变量之间存在替代互补关系，无法通过 调控变量的变动实现稳定房价的目标，政府对市场的干预反而导致房价的波动。最后，通过对预售数量的 分析发现， 发商可以利用其优势地位进行牟利，从而引发固定价格合同道德风险，冲抵宏观调控的效力。 关键词 商品房; 预售; 固定价格合同; 道德风险; 激励 中图分类号：F293.30 文献标识码：A 文章编号： On Fixed Price Pre-Sale Contract of Housings Based on CARA Preference of Developer 1 2 Wu Hai-jun Ma Yong-kai ( 1 School of Economics, Ji Nin University, Guan Zhou 510632 2 School of Management and Economics, UESTC of China, Cheng Du 600054) Abstract: In this paper, we first analyze the fixed price contract that is comparatively realistic in China in the framework of contract theory, and find that incentive exists in the pre-sale contract providing the developers keep part of marketable houses on hold. But, through building a portfolio between contract transfer payment and proceeds of sale completed houses, developers have not take a risk that match the income share obtaining from output of contract, so, the fixed price contract have not enough incentives. And then, considering the problem of macro-control in housing markets, we find that government can achieve its goals altering houses price through unite-changing the macro-control variables, meanwhile, we give the analytic solution by macro-control function. But, when lending rate hold the line,