社会科学的概念如何形成：韦伯概念形成理论的重构.pdfVIP

How are Social-Scientific Concepts Formed? A Reconstruction of Max Webers Theory of Concept Formation Author(s): John Drysdale Reviewed work(s): Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 71-88 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: /stable/202153 . Accessed: 28/10/2012 10:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. . American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Sociological Theory. How are Social-Scientific Concepts Formed? A Reconstruction of Max Webers Theory of Concept Formation* JOHN DRYSDALE Concordia University Recent interpretations of Webers theory of concept formation have concluded that it is seriously defective and therefore of questionable use in social science. Oakes and Burger have argued that Webers ideas depend upon Rickerts epistemology, whose arguments Oakes finds to be invalid; by implication, Webers theory fails. An attempt is made to reconstruct Webers theory on the basis of his 1904 essay on objectivity. Pivotal to Webers theory is his distinction between concept and judgment (hypothesis), where the former is the interpretive means to the formation of explanatory ac