论政策性农业保险中的道德风险及其防范.pdfVIP

On Moral Hazard and It’s Prevention in Agricultural Insurance of China On Moral Hazard and It’s Prevention in Agricultural Insurance of China TUO Guozhu Capital University of Economics and Business Abstract: Since 2007, China’s agricultural insurance has rapidly developed, and the collected premium has 20-fold increase, from 850 million RMB in 2006 to 17.4 billion RMB in 2011. But ，the developing speed has slowed and fluctuated than that of expected in the past three years, especially livestock insurance, there are negative growth in 2009 and 2010, based on the heavy subsidies by governments. One of the important reason is the serious moral hazard cannot be hold back or within limits effectively. Some of these moral hazard problems both occur with the insured and insurer, and local governments. The main reason of the moral hazards is information asymmetry and the short of supervisory system, and local governments’ cognitive gap with regard to agricultural insurance and so on. It is necessary to solve these problems throw many measurers, including legislative, supervisory public subsidies policies, micro operation and management of insurance company, famers learn the knowledge of insurance, so that promote its healthy and speed development of China’s agricultural insurance with government financial support. Key Words: Agricultural Insurance, Moral Hazard, Standardizing and Development 我国政策性农业保险在 2006 年到 2011 险不仅是各家保险公司的重要课题，也是各 年里平均增长速度达到 83%，2011 年末保险 级政府应当关注的重要课题。这个问题的较 费总收入达到创纪录的 174 亿元人民币。但 好解决是我国政策性农业保险制度健康和可 在这五年中增长速度是波动的，特别是养殖 持续发展的关键之一。  业保险业务在此期间波动很大。我初略算了   一下，2007 年中央财政开始补贴种植业和养