《基于收益分享合同垃圾源头分类激励机制》.pdfVIP

13 5 Vo.l 13 No. 5 2010 10 IndustrialEngineering Journal October 2010 1, 2 2 3 , , ( 1. , 401331; 2. , 400030; 3. , 401331) : S tac elberg, 2, , , : , : ; ; : F253. 4 : A : 2010) IncentiveMechanism ofResidentBehavior inHouseholdWaste Separation Based onRevenue Sharing Contract 1, 2 2 3 Cao Jun , X iong Zhong ai, H e Zh iwu ( 1. E conom y and M anagem ent Schoo,l Chongqing University of Science Technology, Chongq ing 401331, Ch ina; 2. College of Econom y and Business Adm inistration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, Ch ina; 3. ChongqingW astetoEnergy Research and Technology Institute, Chongq ing 401331, Ch ina) Abstract: Householdw aste separation by resident at the source can increases the combustion heat value of combustiblew aste in the garbage incineration pow er plant, and at the same tmi e reduces cost asw el.l To incite the residents to separate theirw aste at source, the garbage incineration power plant should shares its profitw ith the residents. Under the conditions of fixed and variable disposal fee, a wt ostage Stac elberg dynamic game model is presented to describe the profit sharing problem. By this model, it show s how the garbage incineration pow er plant should design the terms in the contract w ith the residents such that the residents are w illing to separate their householdw aste at source and at the same tmi e the profit of the pow er plant is maxmi ized. ey words: revenue sharing contract; w aste separation; incentive mechan ism ,