信息不对称与贷款审批权安排-中国经济学教育科研网.doc

研究领域：微观经济学 信息不对称与贷款审批权安排：理论与中国银行业的经验 邹传伟( 中央汇金投资有限责任公司 2006年8月 摘 要 本文从理论上和实证上对四大国有商业银行县级支行的贷款审批权做了分析。理论部分将银行抽象成中心行与分支行两级，并纳入委托代理框架。假设银行与申请贷款的企业之间存在信息不对称。企业有两个特征：贷款金额和经营风险。贷款金额能被银行观察到；分支行能观察到经营风险，而中心行只能以一定的概率观察到，但这个概率是贷款金额的增函数。这个假设依据的是近几年对硬信息和软信息的研究。中心行如果将贷款交给分支行审批，会有两种方向相反的效应：分支行具有信息优势，能实现贷款的有效配置；但分支行的目标函数与中心行不一致，会产生代理问题。前者是贷款金额的减函数，后者是增函数。可以证明，存在唯一的临界贷款金额（或分支行的贷款审批权限），在其上的贷款申请由中心行处理，在其下的由分支行处理。这样就内生地得到了贷款的分级审批制。本文对分支行的贷款审批权进行了比较静态分析。根据北京大学中国经济研究中心2005年在全国范围内的一次金融生态环境调查数据，本文进行了实证分析，既进行了横截面数据分析，也进行了面板数据分析，既使用了线性模型，也使用了Tobit模型。对县级支行的贷款审批权用两个不同的代理变量分别进行了回归。本文也讨论了可能存在的内生性问题。回归结果体现出良好的稳健性，并基本证明了理论部分提出的假说。 关键词 贷款审批权 委托代理 信息不对称 硬信息 软信息 Information Asymmetry and the Allocation of Loan Approval Right: Theory and the Experience of Chinese Banking Industry Abstract This paper focuses on the theoretical and empirical analysis of loan approval right possessed by county-level branches of four big state-owned commercial banks. In the theoretical part, banks are analyzed under the frame of principal-agency theory by classifying them into two levels, center and local branches. There is information asymmetry between banks and enterprises applying for loans. Two characteristics of enterprises matter to banks: the size of loans and management risk. While the size of loans borrowed by enterprises is obvious to both levels of banks, management risk is more directly observable to local branches whereas only generally observable to central branches with certain probability which is an increasing function of loan size. These assumptions are based on the relevant research on hard information and soft information emerging in recent years. If central branches delegate the right of approving loans to local branches, two opposite effects might follow: the effective allocation effect achieved by local branches with information advantage and agency problem effect caused by the conflicts between the objective functions of two levels of banks. With loan size increases, t