中央财政转移作为促进地区分工的机制.docVIP

收益递增、发展战略与区域经济的分割 陆铭 陈钊 严冀* 第一稿，2003年8月 (欢迎批评) 摘 要：本文考察了由计划经济向市场经济的过渡对区域分工所产生的影响，以及在收益递增条件下产生区域经济分割的根源。在市场经济体制下，由于较发达地区在高技术产业拥有比较优势，再加上一般也具有较快的人力资本速度，所以往往在谈判中占据了更高的谈判地位，从而在分工收益的分配过程中占据了较大的份额。而较落后地区如果选择暂时不加入分工体系，它将失去当期分工的收益，同时却可能实现对发达地区的追赶，并提高自己在未来分配分工收益的谈判中的地位。数值模拟的结果显示，虽然对发达地区的追赶是很难的，但落后地区的确可能通过提高自己未来的谈判地位而更多地分享分工的收益。而且，发达地区初始技术水平越高，其学习速度越快，其谈判地位越高，于是落后地区就更加有激励通过发展一些战略性的产业来提高自己未来的谈判地位。落后地区的战略性行为虽然在一定条件下对于其自身是有利的，但却造成了社会总产品和资源配置效率的损失。我们还证明，由于落后地区选择不分工主要是为了在未来分享分工收益时获得更多的份额，那么，中央政府的财政转移就可以促使其加入分工体系，放弃违背比较优势的发展战略。 关键词：收益递增 区域分工 市场分割 财政转移 JEL分类号：C78，H77，R11，R58  Increasing Return, Development Strategy and Regional Economic Segmentation Ming Lu, Zhao Chen and Ji Yan First Version, Aug. 2003 (Comments welcome.) Abstract: This paper has explored the effects of transition from planned system to market system on regional specialization, and the causes of regional economic segmentation with increasing return. In a market economy, the better-developed region has comparative advantage in high-tech industries and higher speed of human capital accumulation, and consequently a higher position in interregional bargaining and a larger share of the benefits of regional specialization. If the less-developed region does not specialize, it will lose the benefits of regional specialization, but it might also gain by catching-up and a higher bargaining power. Simulation results indicate that though the catching-up effect is not strong enough for the less-developed to segment the market, it might still benefit by improving their bargaining power and sharing more in the benefits of future specialization. The higher is the technological level of better-developed region, the higher is its speed of human capital accumulation, the higher is its bargaining power, and the more beneficial is it for the less-developed region to raise its bargaining power by developing “strategic” industries. Though under certain conditions it’s self-beneficial for the less-developed region to behave strate