《市场竞争、企业产权与政府补贴》.docVIP

目录 1. 引言 1 2. 文献综述 2 2.1. 国外文献 2 2.2. 国内文献 3 2.3. 文献评价 4 3. 理论分析与研究假设 4 4. 研究设计 6 4.1. 样本与数据来源 6 4.2. 模型设定与变量定义 6 5. 实证分析 7 5.1 描述性统计 7 5.2. 相关性分析 9 5.3. 多元回归分析 10 6. 结论 11 参考文献 12 致谢 13 市场竞争、企业产权与政府补贴 摘要：本文以2009-2012年沪深两地上市公司为研究样本，根据“市场竞争——产权性质——政府补贴”的理论框架，提出假设、构建模型、收集数据，研究市场竞争、企业的产权性质对政府补贴的影响。结果发现：在控制其他不变情况下，国有企业比民营企业获得的补贴程度更高；有政治联系的企业比没有政治联系的企业获得的补贴程度更高；市场竞争越激烈，企业获得的补贴程度越少。这一结果从侧面反映出我国政企关系现状以及政府补贴的倾向性，同时有助于政府部门寻找市场规律。国家政府及监管部门应该遵循规律，创造平等的市场竞争环境，推行适当的补助政策，让政府补贴实现价值最大化，促进中国经济增长。 关键词：政府补贴；企业产权；市场竞争；政治关联 Market Competition, Ownership and Government subsidy Abstract: This paper uses the samples of Shenzhen and Shanghai listed firms during 2009~2012.To explore the influence of the market competition strength and the nature of property right to the government subsidies, which by building a theoretical framework of market competition——property rights——government subsidy, putting forward a hypothesis, building the model and collecting the relevant data. The results show that the subsidies to state-owned enterprises is more than private enterprises under the condition of constant control the other; enterprises with political connections will be a greater degree of enterprise get subsidies than no political affiliation; the more intense market competition, the less degree of subsidies to enterprise. This results from the side reflects the relationship between government and enterprises in our country present situation and propensity to government subsidies, and help to find the market rules. Governments and regulators should follow the rule to create equal competition in the market environment, and implement appropriate subsidy policy. It make government subsidies to achieve maximum value to promote Chinas economic growth. Key Words: Government Subsidy；wnership；Market ompetition；Political [1]。在经济转型时期，市场机制不能发挥良好的资源配置的基础性作用，此时政府就在资源配置中担任起了主角。如果把国有企业和政府的关系比作“亲父子”，民营企业是否也要“拉关系”找“干爹”来帮忙、分得市场资源的一杯羹？这样的特殊关系是否会影响到政府补贴力度的大小和在市场中的竞争力？在国内市场经济推进和国际竞争加剧中，不同行业以及不同经营规