博弈论lecture4概要.ppt

* 博弈论 * Cournot model of oligopoly How to find a Nash equilibrium Find the quantities (q1*, ... qn*) such that qi* is firm i’s best response to other firms’ quantities That is, q1* solves Max u1(q1, q2*, ..., qn*)=q1(a-(q1+q2* +...+qn*)-c)subject to 0 ? q1 ? +∞and q2* solvesMax u2(q1*, q2 , q3*, ..., qn*)=q2(a-(q1*+q2+q3*+ ...+ qn*)-c)subject to 0 ? q2 ? +∞....... * 博弈论 * Summary Nash equilibrium Concave function and maximization Cournot model of duopoly and oligopoly Next time Bertrand model of Duopoly Reading lists Sec 1.2.B of Gibbons and Sec 3.1-3.2 of Osborne Lecture 4 May 22, 2003 * 博弈论 博弈论 * 博弈论 * Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Complete Information Concave Function and Maximization Cournot models of duopoly and oligopoly * 博弈论 * Outline of Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies Nash equilibrium Review of concave functions, optimization Applications of Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy equilibrium * 博弈论 * Agenda Review of previous classes Concave functions Solving maximization problem Cournot models of duopoly and oligopoly * 博弈论 * Review: iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies If a strategy is strictly dominated, eliminate it The size and complexity of the game is reduced Eliminate any strictly dominated strategies from the reduced game Continue doing so successively -1 , -1 -9 , 0 0 , -9 -6 , -6 Prisoner 1 Prisoner 2 Confess Mum Confess Mum * 博弈论 * Definition: Nash Equilibrium Given others’ choices, player i cannot be better-off if she deviates from si* Prisoner 2 Mum Confess Prisoner 1 Mum -1 , -1 -9 , 0 Confess 0 , -9 -6 , -6 * 博弈论 * Nash equilibrium survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies 1 , 0 1 , 2 0 , 1 0 , 3 0 , 1 2 , 0 Player 1 Player 2 Middle Up Down Left 1 , 0 1 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 1 Player 1 Player 2 Middle Up Down Left Right * 博弈论 * The strategies