《产权性质债务融资与破产威胁效应-来自中国上市公司的经验证据》.docVIP

产权性质、债务融资与破产威胁效应 —来自中国上市公司的经验证据 【摘要】：本文以2005-2009年陷入财务困境的上市公司为研究样本，运用因子分析、相关分析和Granger因果检验等方法研究债务融资在两类产权性质企业中的破产威胁效应。研究发现，相对于国有产权控股企业，私有产权控股企业的债务总体上更能够发挥破产威胁效应。商业信用在两类产权性质企业中均未能发挥破产威胁效应，而银行贷款在私有产权控股企业中更能够发挥破产威胁效应。短期债务在私有产权控股企业中更容易发挥破产威胁效应，而长期债务在国有产权控股企业中更难以发挥破产威胁效应。 【关键词】：债务融资；债务期限结构；债务来源结构；产权性质；破产威胁效应 Ownership, Debt Financing and the Effectiveness of Bankruptcy Threat: Empirical Evidence from China’s Listed Companies Zhou Xuefeng Liu Shulian (School of Accounting，Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116023,China) Abstract: This paper takes listed companies which get into financial distress from 2005-2009 as sample, empirically tests the effectiveness of bankruptcy threat of debt financing in double ownership companies through methods which including factor analysis, correlation analysis and granger causality analysis and so on. The results indicate that debt exerts more bankruptcy threat effect in private companies than in state-owned-companies (SOCS). The results prove that commercial credit has no bankruptcy threat effect in companies of double ownership structure, while bank loans exert more bankruptcy threat effect in private companies than in SOCS. The results suppose that short-term debt exerts more bankruptcy threat effect in private companies than in SOCS, while long-term debt exerts less than bankruptcy threat effect in SOCS than in private companies. Key Words: debt financing; debt maturity structure; the source of debt structure; ownership; the effectiveness of bankruptcy threat. 一、问题提出和文献评述 关于债务融资的研究主要沿着两个方向展开：一是债务融资效应观，二是债务融资治理观。前者是以降低融资成本，合理设置债务结构为核心；后者是以降低代理成本、发挥债务治理机制为核心。根据债务融资契约理论，债务治理机制主要包括债务融资引起的控制权转移效应和投资激励与约束效应。本文主要从融资治理观出发，讨论控制权转移效应。在债务融资的控制权转移效应中，破产威胁效应的约束力最强。在正常情况下，债务契约一旦形成，债务人便按债务契约承担还本付息的义务，当公司陷入财务困境时，债权人便有权行使接管控制权的职能（Shleifer and Vishny,1986;Gilson,1989;Altman and Hotchkiss,2006）。在此情况下，对控股股东和经理人来说意味着控制权收益的丧失。因此，债务融资带来的破产威胁效应，一方面会激励管理者提高经营业绩降低财务风险；另一方面也会促使控股股东积极发挥监督职能。从债务融资治理的制度环境看，不同国家的法律和产权制度会影响到破产威胁效应的发