internationalstudiesinthephilosophyofscience,vol.18no.1.doc

international studies in the philosophy of science, vol. 18 no.1 March 2004 (published with a reply from Jim Woodward, and a related paper by Peter machamer) Analyzing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual Jim Bogen University of Pittsburgh Abstract Using Jim Wordward’s account as an example, I argue that causal claims about indeterministic systems cannot be satisfactorily analyzed as including counterfactual conditionals among their truth conditions because the counterfactuals such accounts must appeal to need not have truth values. Where this happens, counterfactual analyses transform true causal claims into expressions which are not true. i. Introduction Elizabeth Anscombe used to say the trouble with Utilitarian explanations of moral notions is that no one has a clear enough notion of what happiness is to use it to explain anything. I think the project of using counterfactuals to explain causality is equally unpromising—not because we don’t know enough about counterfactuals, but because what we do know argues against their telling us much about causality. I’ll illustrate my reasons for thinking this by criticizing Jim Woodward’s Counterfactual Dependency account (CDep) of causality. CDep is as good as counterfactual analyses of what it is for one thing to exert a causal influence on another get. If it fails, other counterfactual accounts should fare no better. What I will be criticizing is the idea that whether one thing causes, or makes a causal contribution to the production of another depends in part upon what would have been, (would be or would turn out to be) the case if something that did not (or could not) happen had happened (were happening, or would happen). I will not argue against using counterfactuals for purposes other than saying what it is for one thing to cause or make a causal contribution to the production of another. For example, I don’t see anything wrong with the use to which counterfactuals are