基于成本对比的制造商与授权再制造商博弈模型.pdfVIP

第 31 卷第 3 期 系统工程学报 Vo1.31 No.3 2016 年 6 月 JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING Juo.2016 基于成本对比的制造商与授权再制造商博弈模型 邹宗保，王建军，邓贵仕，刘 锋 (大连理工大学系统工程研究所，辽宁大连 116024) 摘要:生产成本的变化将改变制造商对专利许可费的抉择，从而导量生制造商和授权再制造商的博弈行为发生变化. 针对专利产品授权再制造问题，研究制造与再制造成本比值变化下制造商与授权再制造商之间博弈行为.研究结果 显示，成本比值变化导致制造商与再制造商博弈行为发生改变，二者对生产成本的敏感性也随之变化.同时也发现， 当再制造成本降到某个水平时，再制造成本的下降并不能增加再制造商的利润，而通过专利许可费全部转化为制造 商的利润.最后，通过数值算例，验证了模型方法的有效性. 关键词:再制造;专利产品;专利授权;成本比值 中固分类号 :C934 文献标识码 :A 文章编号: 1000-5781(2016)03-0373 一l3 doi: 10.13383/ki扣e.2016.03.009 Game model between the original manufacturer and the authorized remanufacturer based on the costs comparison Zou Zongbao, Wang Jianjun, Deng Guishi, Liu Feng (lnstitute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technolo町， Dalian 116024, China) Abstract: The strategic behaviors of the original equipment manufacturer and the authorized remanufacturer not only are affected by the production costs, but also are influenced by the patent licensing fees. The original equipment manufacturer adjusts the patent licensing fees as the cost charged by the authorized remanufacturer varies, and the strategic behaviors of the original equipment manufacturer and the authorized remanufacturer also change. This paper describes the strategic behaviors of the authorized production between the original equipment manufacturer and the authorized remanufacturer. Theresults show 也 at the strategic behaviors of the original equipment manufacturer and the authorized remanufacturer are influenced by the variation in the costs ratio and that the sensitivities t。由e production costs are als