基于演化博弈的油田企业节能减排意愿研究.docVIP

International Journal of Ecology 世界生态学, 2013, 2, 1-5 /10.12677/ije.2013.21001 Published Online February 2013 (/journal/ije.html) The Study on Oil Field Enterprises’ Intention of Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Based on Evolutionary Game Hao Ding, Rufeng Dai , Rong Rong * China University of Petroleum, Qingdao * Email: dairufeng111@163.com Received: Jan. 17 , 2013; revised: Jan. 24 , 2013; accepted: Feb. 8 , 2013 th th th Abstract: Energy conservation and emission reduction has become a hot spot in the study of domestic and foreign scholars. As a high energy consumption industry, it is important to study the control of government intervention, whether the oilfield enterprise take actions for energy conservation and emission reduction work. In this paper, on the basis of the traditional game, we use the bounded rationality and incomplete information game theory, and divide the oilfield enterprise into emissions reduction enterprise and the enterprises that don’t has the intention of energy conser- vation and emission reduction. Through the setting of the performance of oil field enterprises and the government con- trol of the parameters, it establishes the dynamic replication equation, and it concludes that the size of the fitness of the two groups in the entire oil industry. With different parameters, it is concluded that oilfield enterprises’ intention of en- ergy saving and emission reduction is directly related to the size of the degree of the government regulation. By formu- lating rational policy, the government can be a good guide for oilfield enterprises to develop the energy conservation and emissions reduction work. Keywords: Oil Field Enterprise; Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction; Evolutionary Game 基于演化博弈的油田企业节能减排意愿研究 * 浩，代汝峰，荣 丁 蓉 中国石油大学，青岛 Email: dairufeng1