ch17不对称信息程序.ppt

* 2 of 35 ? 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing ? Microeconomics ? Robert S. Pindyck, 8e. Chapter 17: Markets with Asymmetric Information * of 28 Copyright ? 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall ? Microeconomics ? Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 7e. Fernando Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Markets with Asymmetric Information 17 C H A P T E R Copyright ? 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall ? Microeconomics ? Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 7e. 第17章 不对称信息 17.1 质量的不确定性和柠檬市场 17.2 市场信号 17.3 道德风险 17.4 委托代理问题 17.5 经理激励 17.6 劳动力市场的效率工资论 QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 ● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction. The Market for Used Cars The Market for Used Cars Figure 17.1 When sellers of products have better information about product quality than buyers, a “lemons problem” may arise in which low-quality goods drive out high quality goods. In (a) the demand curve for high-quality cars is DH. However, as buyers lower their expectations about the average quality of cars on the market, their perceived demand shifts to DM. QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 The Market for Used Cars The Market for Used Cars (continued) Figure 17.1 Likewise, in (b) the perceived demand curve for low-quality cars shifts from DL to DM. As a result, the quantity of high-quality cars sold falls from 50,000 to 25,000, and the quantity of low-quality cars sold increases from 50,000 to 75,000. Eventually, only low quality cars are sold. ● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction. QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS 17.1 The Market for Used Cars The lemons problem: With asymmetric information, low-quality goods can drive high-quality goods out of the market. Implications of Asymmetric Information Adverse Selection ● adverse selection Form of market failure resulting when