工程安全监理的博弈分析.pdfVIP

第 28 卷第 1 期 • ..精唾 VoL28 , No.l BUILDlNG SCIENCE Jan. 2012 2012 年 1 月 [文章编号]1∞2-8528(2012)01 -01∞-04 Â程姿公监短伪悴弈令祈 鹿中山1.2 ，杨树萍2 ，杨善林3(1. 合肥工大建设监理有限责任公司，合肥 23刷9ι 合肥工业大学土木建筑工程学院， 合肥 23仪附9;3. 合肥工业大学管理学院，合肥 23∞09) [摘 要]在博弈论的框架下对工程安全监理进行了分析.首先给出博弈分析的基本假设，然后分析了阶段博弈和重复 憾弈模型，得到博弈分析的均衡战略，指出承包商为了其经济利益而进行安全不投入，希望通过侥幸而不出现安全事故这种 现象不可避免，这是博弈均衡的必然结果，文中给出了其证明。通过采取提高罚款数额 F( 从而提高惩罚系数刀、提高奖励系 数 A 、降低监控成本 C 等措施可以将承包商安全不投入，从而将出现安全事故的概率控制在一定范围内。 [关键词]博弈分析E 均衡战略:安全监理;阶段博弈z 元限次重复博弈;纳什均衡 [申圄分类号] TU114 [文献标识码] B The Game Analysis on the Engineering Safety Supervision LU Zhong-shan 1 2 , YANG Shu-pini , YANG Shan-lin 3 • ( 1. Construction Superouion Co. Ltd, H价， i Universitr 0/ Technology , H电， fei 230∞9 ， China; 2. hool 0/ ciflü engineeri晤， H电， fei UnivenÏlr 0/ Technology , Hφ， i 230∞9 ， China; 3. hool 0/ management , H电， fei UnivenÏlr 0/ Technology , H快让细则， ， China) [ Abstract] The engineering safety supervision is analyzed under the framework of game 曲曲巧. First , the basic hypothesis of game analysis is given , then the stage game and repeated game are analyzed , the equilibrium strategy of 由eg田ne analysis is produced. Its the certain result that the contractor will not invest enough to 由e engineering safety for its benefit and the safety accident will not happen by luck. This paper gives the proof. Through 由e me副ures of improving the fine amount F , the fine coefficient f ，由e reward coefficientλand reducing the control cost C , we can contr刨出e contractors no pay for safety and the probability of 由e safety accident to a certain scope. [Key words] game analysis; 吨uilibrium 8回，tegy; safety supervision; stage game; infinitely repeated game; Nash 呵uiIibrium 是否符合工程建设强制性标准。……工程监理单