基于管理防御企业投资短视行为实验探究.docVIP

基于管理防御企业投资短视行为实验探究摘 要:国外研究成果已从理论上证明经理管理防御动机是导致企业投资短视行为的主要原因之一。但在企业中经理人员决策投资项目的真实动机是不可直接观察的,加之企业投资决策过程和资料的保密性,很难通过实证分析方法对管理防御与投资短视行为之间的关系进行研究。本文采取实验研究方法,通过制定标准实验流程与实验说明书,对210名实验参与者的实验数据进行统计分析,发现在我国不同类型企业中普遍存在着经理管理防御行为的动机,这种动机导致了企业的投资短视行为;而且随着经理能力下降和预期转换工作成本的提高,其管理防御程度呈上升趋势,投资短视行为更加显著。 关键词:投资短视;管理防御;实验研究 中图分类号:F272.91 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1003-5192(2009)06-0007-06 Experimental Study on Corporate Investment Myopia Behaviorunder Managerial Entrenchment LI Bing-xiang1, HAO Yan1,2 (1.School of Business Management, Xian University of Technology,Xi?an710054, China; 2.School of Economic Management, Northwest University of Politics and Law, Xi?an710063, China) Abstract:Foreign research results have proved theoretically that manager managerial entrenchment is one of the main reasons of corporate investment myopia behavior. But in corporate the true motive that the manager making investment decision can not be directly observed, and as the secrecy of investment decision-making process and data in corporate, it is difficult to use the empirical analysis method to study the relationship between managerial entrenchment and investment myopia. The paper used experimental study method, formulated standard experimental flow and experimental instructions, and found that there is widespread manager managerial entrenchment behavioral motive in different types of enterprises in China and this motive will lead corporate investment myopia behavior; moreover with the decrease of ability and the increase of expected relocation cost, manager’s managerial entrenchment degree is on the rise and the investment myopia behavior is even more remarkable based on the statistical analysis of the 210 experimental participants’ experimental data. Key words:investment myopia; managerial entrenchment; experimental study 1 引言 投资短视(Investment Myopia)是非效率投资的一种,是指企业不遵循最佳投资政策,而是选择那些能迅速回报但并不能使公司价值最大化的项目进行投资[1]。经理的投资短视行为使得企业追求短期效益,延迟甚至放弃使企业价值最大化的投资项目。Lundstrum认为投资短视的潜在原因是管理层的职业考虑,即经理人不仅关心本期的在职收