those versions try to contain epistemology in （这些版本尝试u201C包含u201D认识论）.pdfVIP

CHAPTER V QUINES NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY: ITS METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Simulated versions of naturalized epistemology are quite seductive. For, even if the adherents of those versions make claims of doing epistemology, interestingly enough, often those versions tempt us to give up the age old epistemological problems. Some of those versions plead for the annihilation of epistemology and many of those versions try to contain epistemology in natural science without containing natural science in epistemology. Quines 1 Naturalized Epistemology (QNE ) is quite distinct in this respect in that it advocates for the reciprocal containment of epistemology and natural science. Obviously, QNE is not nihilistic . But the optimism it professes is not by means of a complete surrender by either epistemology to natural science, or vice versa. Epistemologists and natural scientists are kept in the same boat, to wit, Neuraths boat is the only boat in the waters of mans wisdom. Richard Rortys epistemological nihilism and Goldmans epistemics can be viewed as the strong representatives of the above mentioned, broadly divided, two groups of simulated versions of naturalized epistemology. For Rortys view point outrightly denies the possibility of any fruitfully pursued subject as a successor to 1Hereafter Quines Naturalised Epistemology has been abbreviated as QNE. 182 epistemology; instead of simply denying the viability of epistemological enterprises currently undertaken or traditionally taken care of. In case of epistemics, though natural science contains epistemology, epistemology contains philosophical doub