高管薪酬分散公司治理与企业绩效【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance Executive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives. The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance. We draw on two competing models—the tournament theory and equity fairness arguments—to formulate our hypotheses: Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in the co