the structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation的结构突变和合作的进化.pdfVIP

The Structure of Mutations and the Evolution of Cooperation ´ ´ Julian Garcıa*, Arne Traulsen ¨ Research Group for Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plon, Germany Abstract Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e., if there are n strategies a single mutation can result in any strategy with probability 1=n. However, in biological systems it seems natural that not all mutations can arise from a given state. Certain mutations may be far away, or even be unreachable given the current composition of an evolving population. These distances between strategies (or genotypes) define a topology of mutations that so far has been neglected in evolutionary game theory. In this paper we re-evaluate classic results in the evolution of cooperation departing from the assumption of uniform mutations. We examine two cases: the evolution of reciprocal strategies in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and the evolution of altruistic punishment in a public goods game. In both cases, alternative but reasonable mutation kernels shift known results in the direction of less cooperation. We therefore show that assuming uniform mutations has a substantial impact on the fate of an evolving population. Our results call for a reassessment of the ‘‘model-less’’ approach to mutations in evolutionary dynamics. ´ Citation: Garcıa J, Traulsen A (2012) The Structure of Mutations and the Evolution of Cooperation. PLoS ONE 7(4): e35287. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035287 Editor: Attila Szolnoki, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary Received January 30, 2012;