管理层控制下的高管激励及产品市场竞争关联实证分析.pdfVIP

管理经济学…… 管理层控制下的高管激励与产品市场竞争关联实证分析 涂锦 王燕杰 涂锦 王燕杰 涂涂锦锦 王王燕燕杰杰 西南交通大学经济管理学院 四川 成都（610031） 西南交通大学经济管理学院 四川 成都（610031） 西西南南交交通通大大学学经经济济管管理理学学院院 四四川川 成成都都（（661100003311）） 摘要: 摘要: 摘摘要要::市场竞争强度是影响高管努力和承担风险的客观因素,市场竞争强度是可 以观察和度量的,应将市场竞争强度作为高管是否更可能泛用控制权及激励决定 的客观参照因素。该文以hackman模型及2001-2005年414家中国上市公司面板 数据分析上市公司市场竞争度与管理层控制权条件下高管激励的关系,以描述市 场竞争如何作为外部机制影响高管激励选择。结论表明:产品市场竞争度对薪酬 （显性激励）增加的影响显著为正,即市场竞争度的增加,公司会增加对高管的显 性激励力度；国企在显性激励力度上低于非国企有。另一方面市场竞争度提高也 会使高管减少利用控制权获取隐性收益的可能性。国企在隐性激励力度上显著的 高于非国企。 关键词: 关键词: 关关键键词词::产品市场竞争度；管理层控制;显性激励;隐性激励 Empirical Study on link between Product-Market Competition and Senior Managers′ incentive under Executive Controlling Tu Jin Wang Yanjie Tu Jin Wang Yanjie TTuu JJiinn WWaanngg YYaannjjiiee School of Economics and management of South West Jiaotong University Chengdu Sichuan 610031 Abstract Product-Market Competition could be the impersonal factor which impact on how the Senior Managers make efforts for work, take risky。Product-Market Competition can be observed and calculated . The paper suggested we should take it as impersonal reference of inferring to Managerial Power over-used and Senior Managers incentive. Using panel data and Hackman sample section model , we analysed the link between Product-Market Competition and Senior Managers′ incentive under Executive Controlling. The result show that the Senior Manager’s salary(explicit benefits) be influenced significantly and positively by Product-Market Competition. State-own firms have less explicit benefits than non-state-own firms. Other hand when Product-Market Competition increase, the implicit benefits would be decreased. State-own firms have more implicit benefits than non-state-own firms.