我国城市大型体育公共设施供给问题研究.PDFVIP

35 　7 Vol.35　No.7 2012 7 Journal of Beijing Sport University Jul.2012 ○ ——— 1 2 2 1 2 2 郑志强, 陶长琪 , 彭　莉, 仇　军, 詹新寰, 朱亚坤 (1., 　100084;2., 　330013) 　:, 。 , , 。 , ; , , ;、 。 , 、、。 :;;; :G80-05　　: 　　:1007-3612(2012)07-0001-05 Research on Supply Policy of Chinas Urban Public Sports Facilities ———Based on Principal-agent Model under symmetrical Information 1 2 2 1 2 2 ZHENG Zhi-qiang , T O Chang-qi , PENG Li , QIU Jun , ZH N Xin-huan , ZHU Ya-kun (1.P.E.Dept., Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China; 2.P.E.Inst., Jiangxi University of Finance Economics, Nanchang 330013, Jiangxi China) Abstract:Insufficient supply of public sports facilities restricted the development of sports in China.The key to solve the problem is how to improve the construction of public sports facilities and operation mode.With the principal-agent theory of information economy, this article starts from the analysis on the interest body behaviors between the government and social investors, and construct a principal-agent model under asymmetric informa- tion to explore the principal-agent of China s major sports facilities.The study show s the incentives designed around the optimal sports facilities supply can reduce the risk of stadium principal-agent.The result of the game between the government and social investors makes two sides are more consistent in the target of working harder and reducing cost.But they have different degree of risk aversion.The government should pa