失地农民维权行为的演化博弈分析.docVIP

失地农民维权行为的演化博弈分析 郑月龙 冷峥峥 重庆工商大学管理学院 重庆财经职业学院会计系 X 关注成功！ 加关注后您将方便地在 我的关注中得到本文献的被引频次变化的通知！ 新浪微博 腾讯微博 人人网 开心网 豆瓣网 网易微博 摘????要： 失地农民是城镇化进程中的产物, 若农民被征用土地而不能得到正当补偿就可能诱发其维权行为, 这是我国城镇化进程中面临的突出社会问题, 针对此问题, 运用演化博弈论建立失地农民群体间的博弈模型, 分析失地农民维权行为发生的内在原因和演化规律;研究发现:失地农民维权行为具有较强的学习与模仿等有限理性特征, 预期征地补偿是失地农民选择维权的基本动力;失地农民对未来生活越是担忧越可能选择维权, 较高的维权难度和较大的失地农民群体规模是抑制失地农民维权行为的两个重要因素;研究结论对于理解失地农民的维权行为并据此制定相应政策均有一定启示意义。 关键词： 城镇化; 失地农民; 演化博弈; 维权行为分析; 作者简介：郑月龙 (1981-) , 男, 内蒙古太仆寺旗人, 副教授, 博士, 从事技术经济与创新管理、博弈论及应用研究. 收稿日期：2017-03-09 基金：国家社会科学基金重大项目 (12ZD100) Analysis of Land-lost Peasant Right Protection Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game ZHENG Yue-long LENG Zheng-zheng School of Management, Chongqing Technology and Business University; Department of Accounting, Chongqing College of Finance and Economics; Abstract： The land-lost peasants are the product in the process of urbanization, if peasants land is expropriated but can not get proper compensation, the peasants right protection behavior will possibly be trigged, which is typically social problem in the process of urbanization. Based on this, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to set up the game model among the land-lost peasant groups and analyzes internal cause and evolutionary law for the right protection behavior of the land-lost peasants. The research finds that the right protection behavior of the land-lost peasants has limited rational characteristics such as relatively strongly learning and imitating and so on, that expected land expropriation compensation is the basic power for the land-lost peasant to choose their right protection behavior, that the more the land-lost peasants concern about their future, the more possibly they choose their right protection behavior, and that the higher right protection difficulty and the bigger land-lost peasants scale are the two important factors for the land-lost peasants to choose right protection behavior. The research conclusion has certain inspiration significance to both the