Forward security in Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption Scheme在分层的基于身份的加密方案的前向安全性.ppt

Forward security in Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption Scheme在分层的基于身份的加密方案的前向安全性.ppt

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Forward security in Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption Scheme在分层的基于身份的加密方案的前向安全性

ID-Based Encryption for Complex Hierarchies with Applications to Forward Security and Broadcast Encryption Identity-based Encryption (IBE) and Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) IBE [Shamir 84] [Boneh Frankline 01] [Cocks 01] [Canetti Halevi Katz 03] [Boneh Boyen 04] [Waters 04] HIBE [Horwitz Lynn 02] [Gentry Silverberg 02] [Boneh Boyen 04] Why need forward-secure HIBE? In HIBE, exposure of parent private keys compromises children’s keys Forward security [Gunther 89] [Diffie Oorschot Wiener 92] [Anderson 97] [Bellare Miner 99] [Malkin Micciancio Miner 02] [Canetti Halevi Katz 03] Secret keys are evolved with time Compromising current key does NOT compromise past communications Forward-secure HIBE mitigates key exposure Applications of fs-HIBE Forward-secure public-key broadcast encryption (fs-BE) BE schemes: [Fiat Naor 93] [Luby Staddon 98] [Garay Staddon Wool 00] [Naor Naor Lotspiech 01] [Halevy Shamir 02] [Kim Hwang Lee 03] [Goodrich Sun Tamassia 04] [Gentry Ramzan 04] HIBE is used in public-key broadcast encryption [Dodis Fazio 02] Forward security is especially important in BE Multiple HIBE: Encryption scheme for users with multiple roles Hierarchical IBE HIBE [Horwitz Lynn 02] [Gentry Silverberg 02] [Boneh Boyen 04] Forward-secure Public-Key Encryption fs-PKE (Canetti, Halevi, and Katz 2003) Used to protect the private key of one user Based on Gentry-Silverberg HIBE A time period is a binary string Private key contains decryption key and future secrets Erase past secrets in algorithm Update fs-HIBE requirements Dynamic joins Users can join at any time Joining-time obliviousness Collusion resistance Do na?ve combinations of fs-PKE and HIBE work? An fs-HIBE attempt Each entity node maintains one tree For computing children’s private keys For the forward security of itself Not joining-time-oblivious CS joins at (0 1) with public key (School, 0, 1, CS) Bob joins at (1 0) with public key (School, 0, 1, CS, 1, 0, Bob) Sender needs to know when CS and Bob joined Overview o

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