高级微观经济学常见问题分析PPT.ppt

16.7:Show that if for all x0, then the cartel solution involves ?;In a Cartel industry,;Since for all x0 Then we can write it as: That is, ; ; ;Problem (b) ;Firm 1 s optimal choice : When MR=MC, fjirm1 has its optimal choice Revenue=P(Y)*y1 F.O.C with respect to y1 100-2y1-y2=0 y1=50-y2/2;(c)calculate the cournot equilibrium amount of output for each firm Firm 1’s profit function is given by:P1(y1)=(100—（y1+y2）)y1—c2(y2) Firm 2’ profit function is given by: P2(y2)=(100—（y1+y2）)y1—c2(y2) The first-order condition is given by:100—2y1—y2=0 and 100—2y2—y1=0(since firm 1 and 2’s marginal costs are both zero), so we can get the Cournot equilibrium amount of output for each firm as (100/3 100/3) 3023004027 李滔;Problem (d) Calculate the carter amount of output for the industry. ;;;Because the first-order condition equals zero It meas that the output for the industry is 50 That’s all 3023004030 包佳杰;Problem (e): If firm 1 behaves as a follower and firm 2 behaves as a leader, Calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium output of each firm.; The timing of the game is as follows:(1)firm 2 chooses a quantity y2≥0; (2)firm 1 observes y2 and then chooses a quantity y1≥0; (3)the payoff to firm i is given by the profit function where P(Y)=100– Y is the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y=y1+y2 , and c is the constant marginal cost of production. As we know, c=0. So we can write; To solve the backwards-induction outcome of this game, we first compute firm 1’s reaction to an arbitrary quantity by firm 2. R1(y2) solves ; which yields;Since firm 2 can solve firm 1’s problem as well as firm 1 can solve it, firm 2 should anticipat