2011年最新(英文)南洋理工大学NTU能源安全战略(EnergySecurity)教程6共24.ppt

IP 6016: Energy Security Week IV Lecture, Part I Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market Chapter 3: Oil Supplies, OPEC, Oligopoly and Politics (?ystein Noreng, 2002) 30 November 2010 Agenda Concentration and Market Power What are Strategies of Co-Operation and Conflict? Prisoner’s Dilemma for the Oil Market How does Income Needs of Rentier States affect States and Private businesses Taxation and Income Distribution Military Establishment and Internal/External politics? What is the Cycle of Oil Dependence? OPEC Politics Non-OPEC Oil Politics Discussion Questions * * Concentration and Market Power Governments (politics) – determinants of oil supply of OPEC countries Costs and Prices – determinants of oil supplies outside OPEC Oil supply costs should also depend on oil province dynamics World oil reserves are far from being depleted Middle East oil exporters will be unable to find a consensus and a middle ground stabilizing the oil market * Oil market is a natural oligopoly centered on the Gulf Existence of the oil market paradox Total supply of oil is arbitrary Economic interests, regional and international – concerns of core Middle Eastern oil exporters * Strategies of Co-Operation and Conflict Oil market is a co-operative game Strong incentives to cheat or to defect Oil Prices Rising Falling Market Share Rising Enjoying a free ride Testing the competitive edge Falling Gaining from co-operation Getting the fool’s reward Workings Those suppliers that gain on both market shares and prices can be described as free riders, benefiting from the co-operation of others. Those suppliers that suffer a loss of market share in a context of rising oil prices essentially gain from co-operation. Those suppliers pursuing a rising market share in a context of falling prices can be described as testing their competitive edge, eventually to gain positions for future bargaining. Those suppliers that lose market share in a context of falling prices can be described as reap