可抵押资产、社会网络与商业信用.doc

可抵押资产、社会网络与商业信用 唐松王俊杰马杨孙铮 上海财经大学会计学院上海财经大学会计与财务研 宄院上海财经大学学术委员会 本文以我国A股非金融业上市公司2004-2013年间的数据为样本，考察丫可抵 押资产、高管社会网络在商业信用交易中的作用及其交互影响。研宂发现，企业 拥有的可抵押资产价值对获取商业信用有显著的正向影响；随着高管社会网络中 心度的提高，可抵押资产对商业信用获取的正向作用减弱；并且上述效应在市场 化程度较低的地区更加显著。总之，本研究表明，可抵押资产有助于企业获取商 业信用，企业有形的可抵押资产和无形的高管社会网络之间存在替代关系，两 者在商业信用交易中都具有重要的治理作用。 关键词： 商业信用;社会网络;可抵押资产; 唐松，上海财经大学特任研究员、会计学院副教授、会计与财务研究 院研究员、生导师、，主要研究方向为制度与治理、社会关系网络等； 王俊杰，上海财经大学会计学院研究生，主要研究方向为资本市 场中的社会关系网络等； 马杨，上海财经大学会计学院研究生，主要研究方向为公司治 理、资本市场会计与财务问题； 孙铮，上海财经人学学术委员会主任委员、会计与财务研宂院院长、 教授、生导师、，研宄方向为会计理论、公司治理与资本市场等 基金：国家自然科学基金项目 Collaterals, Social Networks and Trade Credits Tang Song Wang Junjie Ma Yang Sun Zheng School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics; Abstract： Based on a sample of China’s nonfinancial A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2013， this paper firstly investigates the role of colaterals on firm’s access to trade credits. Then we further examine the substitution effect of the executives social network on collaterals. Using local real estate price changes as an exogenous shock to the value of firm’s colaterals, the empirical results show that the amount of trade credits which a firm obtains are positively related to the value of collaterals. When the position of the firm’s executives in the social networks is higher, the positive correlation documented above is weaker. Tn addition, the above substitution effect is more pronounced when companies arc located in provinces with low marketization progress because these firms are more relying on relationshipbased transactions. In summary， our finding suggests that collaterals which indicate a firm’s solvency abilities help a firm reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its suppliers or customers and then help it obtain trade credits. This is consistent with the classical theory in finance that the provisions of mortgage on debt can effectively reduce the risk of debtors opportunistic behavior to creditors. Ex ante, the creditor could discriminate the