国企价值增值、高管努力选择与最优长期激励研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据.doc

企价值增值、 期激励研究一- 高管努力选择与最优长 来自我国上市公司的经 验证据 吕洁杜传文薄秋实 复旦大学管理学院南昌大学管理学院 将国企高管的经营管理行为分为两类，一类偏重于提升企业的短期业绩，另一类 偏重于提升企业的长期价值。从理论和实证角度论证，合理的薪酬制度应该建立 与高管的两类行为相匹配的激励机制，即引入以股权激励为主的长期激励，并在 长、短期激励之间建立一个适宜比例。通过对2010-2014年间实施股权激励的 528家上市国企和民企的实证分析表明：在短期激励方而，国企高于民企;在长期 激励方面，国企低于民企。建议在W企高管薪酬制度改革中，不仅耍降低、限制短 期激励，还要相应地提升长期激励，同时通过完善股权激励实施的治理环境、业绩 考核标准等推进国企高管的薪酬制度改革。 关键词： 国企高管;薪酬制度;长期激励; 5洁，女，复旦大学管理学院后，主耍从事资源管理与创新管理研 究； 杜传文，男，复旦大学管理学院后，主要从事经济增长与创新管理 研究; 薄秋实，男，南昌大学商学院讲师,主要从事组织管理与创新管理研究。 2016-12-28 基金：国家自然科学基金项目 The Value Increment of State-owned Enterprises，the Effort Choice of Executives and the Optimal Long Term Incentive LV Jie DU Chuan-wen BO Qiu-shi School of Management，Fudan University; School of Management，Nanchang University; Abstract： In this paper, we studied the problem of executive compensation structure for realizing the value increment of state-owned enterprises. This paper differentiated between two types of state-owned enterprise executives management behavior. One put emphasis on improving the short-term performance of enterprises, and the other on enhancing the long-term value of enterprises. From the theoretical and empirical perspectives, this paper confirmed that reasonable compensation system should establish the incentive mechanism which matches two kinds of behavior of executives. And there is a proper proportion between the long term incentive and short term incentive. Through the empirical analysis of the implementing equity incentive of 528 listed state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the 2010?2014, we found that state-owned enterprises are higher in the short-term incentive than private enterprises;and state-owned enterprises are lower in the long-term incentive than private enterprises. The paper suggested that wc should not only reduce and limit the short-term incentive, but also increase in long-term incentive in the state executive pay system reform. It should improve the governance environment of the implementation of equity incentive