Attack and Flee Game-Theory-Based Analysis on Interactions Among Nodes in MANETs推荐.pdfVIP

612 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART B: CYBERNETICS, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JUNE 2010 Attack and Flee: Game-Theory-Based Analysis on Interactions Among Nodes in MANETs Feng Li, Member, IEEE , Yinying Yang, Student Member, IEEE, and Jie Wu, Fellow, IEEE Abstract—In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes have the inherent In order to minimize the impact of malicious nodes and ability to move. Aside from conducting attacks to maximize their stimulate cooperation, regular nodes monitor and continuously utility and cooperating with regular nodes to deceive them, ma- evaluate their neighbors. Certain criteria are set to distinguish a licious nodes get better payoffs with the ability to move. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework to analyze the node’s trust level toward others. Regular nodes will focus their strategy profiles for regular and malicious nodes. We model the resources on cooperating with neighbors that they trust, decline situation as a dynamic Bayesian signaling game and analyze and requests from suspicious neighbors, and report when a neighbor present the underlining connection between nodes’ best combina- is considered to be malicious. However, in this case, intelligent tion of actions and the cost and gain of the individual strategy. malicious nodes would elaborately choose a frequency at which Regular nodes consistently update their beliefs based on the oppo- nents’ behavior, while malicious nodes evaluate their risk of being they cooperate to deceive regular nodes. caught to decide when to flee. Some possible countermeasures for Moreover, malicious nodes have the strategy of fleeing to regular nodes that can impact malicious nodes’ decisions are pre-