[工程科技]Abstract.pdfVIP

Matrix Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions Robert W. Day S. Raghavan Operations and Information Management Decision and Information Technologies School of Business The Robert H. Smith School of Business University of Connecticut University of Maryland Storrs, CT 06269-1041 College Park, MD 20742-1815 Abstract In a combinational auction in which bidders can bid on any combination of goods, bid data can be of exponential size. We describe an innovative new combinatorial auction format in which bidders submit several “matrix bids”. The advantage of this approach is that it provides bidders a mechanism to compactly express bids on every possible bundle. We describe many different types of preferences that can be modeled using a matrix bid, which is quite flexible, supporting additive, subadditive, and superadditive preferences simultaneously. To utilize the compactness of the matrix bid format in a more general preference environment, we describe a logical language with matrix bids as “atoms”, and show that matrix bids compactly express preferences that require an exponential number of atoms in other bidding languages, and is as expressive as the most sophisticated languages in the literature, (Boutilier, 2002). We model the N P -hard winner-determination problem as a polynomially-sized integer program, specifically an assignment problem with side constraints. We show the strength of this formulation with which we rapidly solve