哈佛大学--博弈论课件英文section3章节幻灯片.pptVIP

GOV 2005: Game Theory Section 3: Social Choice Alexis Diamond adiamond@fas.harvard.edu Agenda Motivating questions and modus operandi Key terms May’s Theorem Arrow’s Theorem The Condorcet winner Condorcet Procedure: Voting Scheme Cycling Single-peaked preferences Median Voter Theorem Motivating Questions What are reasonable/desirable characteristics of the social (aggregate) preference? What are the reasonable/desirable characteristics of individual preferences? How to aggregate individual preferences? Which schemes are possible, and which are impossible, and what are the real-world implications? Voting, democracy, institutional design Under what circumstances will it be rational to reveal information (or preferences) honestly? When won’t it be rational to reveal info in this way? To Consider the Preferences of a Society Modus Operandi First: Define the setting Consider a case of perfect information Define basic rules for allowable preferences Second: Now, consider rules that are still admissible Identify new allowable rules with desirable properties Third: Decide whether these rules provide incentive for honest revelation of preferences Remember: We work with ordinal preferences (including ties) (1) encourage honest information-sharing, and (2) use that information in a reasonable way? Are there systems which Key Terms Social Welfare Functional (SWF) Societal decision rule that creates a social ranking by aggregating individual rank orders “Desireable” properties of the SWF Paretian Property: unanimity rules Symmetry among Agents: voting can be anonymous without changing the result Neutrality among Alternatives: given 2 options, labels given to the possible alternatives don’t matter Positive Responsiveness: if the social ranking is indifferent between two alternatives, and one individual changes preference in favor of one alternative, the social preference must change to favor that alternative Key Terms Transitivity: If x is preferred to y, AND If y