哈佛大学--博弈论课件英文section4章节幻灯片.pptVIP

GOV 2005: Game Theory Section 4: Myerson and Weber Alexis Diamond adiamond@fas.harvard.edu Agenda Main ideas Key terms Analysis The model of multicandidate elections Voting equilibria Example 1: Comparison of voting systems Example 2: Effect of a small minority Candidate positioning game Main Ideas Different electoral systems have different voting equilibria, even when voters preferences are fixed Plurality rule and approval voting can lead to differences in candidate positioning There is a difference between two types of campaign activities Those intended to present information and help voters determine their preferences Those intended to influence the selection of an equilibrium outcome by manipulating perceptions of candidate viability (via focal arbiters) Plurality Rule Less Restrictive than Approval Voting Key Terms Approval voting: can give 1/0 votes to each candidate Plurality rule: can give 1 vote to a single candidate Borda voting: gives 0 votes to one candidate, 1 vote to another, and 2 votes to the remaining candidate Ballot: (v1, v2, … , vk) for candidates 1…k For example, a ballot in a borda count, k=3 might be (2,0,1) Preferences: (u1, u2, … , uk) for candidates 1…k, where ui is the payoff the voter receives if i wins For example, one set of preferences might be (10, 4, 5) Voters are of the same type if they share the same preferences Pivot Probability: Same for All Voters Pivot probability: pij, the probability (perceived by a voter) that candidates i j will tie for 1st place (pij = pji) A voter perceives the probability his vote will break a tie between i j, and elect i to be: max [(pij) (vi – vj), 0] In a plurality-election, r’s ballot might be vr(1,0,0). If his pivot probability that 1 2 will tie for 1st is ? , then his perception of the probability his vote will elect candidate #1 is ?. Note that if the ballot was vr(0,1,0), there is no way that r’s ballot would elect candidate #1. Therefore, max[(pij) (vi – vj), 0] = 0. In a borda-count, r