首席执行官激励如何影响企业所得税的税收筹划和财务报告外文文献.pdfVIP

Rev Account Stud (2016) 21:672–710 DOI 10.1007/s11142-016-9350-6 How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes? 1 2 Kathleen Powers • John R. Robinson • Bridget Stomberg3 Published online: 4 February 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016 Abstract We examine how different accounting metrics used to evaluate CEO performance for annual bonuses affect the level of corporate tax planning as well as financial reporting for income taxes. We predict and find that firms using cash flow metrics report lower GAAP and cash effective tax rates (ETR) than firms using earnings metrics. We also find that firms using after-tax earnings metrics report lower GAAP ETRs but similar cash ETRs as firms using pre-tax earnings metrics. Further analyses show that firms using after-tax earnings metrics are more likely to designate foreign earnings as permanently reinvested and have lower discretionary reserves for tax uncertainty. Hence, it appears that both types of firms engage in similar levels of tax planning, but firms evaluating CEOs with after tax-earnings metrics incentivize different financial reporting choices. Keywords Effective tax rate Performance metrics Executive compensation After-tax compensation JEL Classification H25 M41 M52 John R. Robinson jrobinson@ 1 Haslam College of Business, University of Tennessee, 630 Stokely Mgt Center, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA 2 Mays Business School, Texas AM University, 4353 TAMU, Cllege Station, TX 77843-4353, USA 3 J.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, 234 Brooks Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA 123 How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and … 673 1 Introduction We exploit a 2006 regulation