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Research Proposal Warwick Marshall ‘Developing a framework for identifying a Principals’ ideal course of action in an environment rich in agent collusion’ Key terms: Collusion, Principal-Agent-Relationships, Rent Extraction, Transaction cost, Effort, Incentive, Power of Collusion, Information Powerbase and Transfer, Perceived (heuristic relative) benefit, Joint Utility, Exploitation, Symmetrical and asymmetrical Information, Stake dependence, Side-contracting, Organisational design (contracting structure and monitoring), Game theory, Nash-equilibrium, Utility, Hard/True Information Abstract Quite simply, market places rely heavily on principal(employer)-agent(employee) relationships in order to get ‘stuff’ done. The relationships involved rely on informational exchanges in order for the appropriate value of the agents’ services to be realised. The advantage in the evaluative process lies with whoever has the information powerbase. Multiple conditions exist within market places where agents can collude to get more from the principal (or the principal can collude with agents to get more from secondary agents). Unfortunately the actions identified to stop this collusive behaviour (which can have a negative effect on competitive advantage) can end up costing the principal more than letting the collusive behaviour continue! What the principal needs is a frame work from which to work from to identify what courses of action are the most suitable in a variety of dynamic marketplace situations so as to ensure and maintain competitive advantage by maximising the rent extracted from agents. This document is a proposal for the research into ‘Developing a framework for identifying a Principals’ ideal course of action in an environment rich in agent collusion’ Introduction A framework is probably best described using an analogy; it is a skeletal structure from which one can gain stability for the construction of action. With relation to the proposed topic ‘Developing a framework