风险投资代理冲突影响因素及解决机制分析word格式论文.docxVIP

优秀毕业论文 精品参考文献资料 摘 要 在进入二十一世纪的十多年里，世界各国的经济发生了前所未有的迅猛发 展，技术进步相较之前更加明确的成为决定一个国家经济发展和综合实力的重要 因素。风险投资作为初创企业的一大资金来源在促进技术成果转化成为现实生产 力方面日益发挥着重要的作用，因此成为一国经济发展的关键所在。本文通过系 统地联系交易成本经济学理论、不完全契约理论和委托代理理论分析了影响风险 投资过程中风险投资家和创业家之间委托代理冲突的三个主要因素：交易资产的 专属性、交易的不确定性以及交易的频率。并进一步提出针对以上影响因素的对 应解决机制：在契约中规定股份兑现条款、分阶段投资、联合投资以及直接参与 创业企业经营。最后，通过现实中多个风险投资案例的描述分析证明了本文所提 出影响因素和解决机制的正确性。希望本文的研究结论能够对风险投资的理论研 究和现实实践有所帮助。 关键词：风险投资，代理冲突，交易成本经济学，不完全契约 II Abstract Over the past decade in the 21st century, an unprecedented rapid development has taken place all over the world. Technical progress has become more clearly than before an important factor in determing a nations economic and overall development. As a major funding source for start-ups, Venture Capital plays an increasingly important role in promoting technical achievements into real productivity, thus becoming the key of a nation’s economic development. This paper analyzes three main factors which influence the agency conflicts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs by mixedly using the principle of Transaction Cost Economics, Incomplete Contracting Theory and Principal-agent Theory. The three factors are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transaction. Then we come up with four coping mechanisms of the agency conflicts: vesting, staged financing, investment syndication, participation. At last, we prove the factors and coping mechanisms though the analysis of several real cases. We hope conclusions of this study can have a little help to the theoretical and practical research of venture capital. Keywords ： Venture Capital, Agency Conflicts, Transaction Cost Economics, Incomplete Contracting Theory  PAGE 4 目录  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark0 第 1 章 引言1  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark1 1.1 研究背景 1  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark2 1.2 风险投资的发展 1  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark3 1.3 研究意义、研究内容和创新点以及结构安排 3  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark4 1.3.1 研究意义 3  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark5 1.3.2 研究内容和创新点 4  HYPERLINK \l _bookmark6 1.3.3 本文结构安排 4  HYPE