管理层激励与公司价值——基于终极控制人视角word格式论文.docxVIP

AbstractAccording to principal-agent theory, the enterprise shareholder of the companys management in order to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, they will pay and the companys management to enter a contract, to encourage or restrict their management behavior, constraints in the wage contract, in management efforts to improve business performance, by increasing their salary incentive. In reality, the relative concentration of listed companies, mostly by ultimately control the ultimate controller, the final control of the companys decision will lead to eventually control the conflict between personal income sources and management incentive, this will weaken the management incentive effect.This article selects the period 2006-2010 listed companies in Shanghai and shenzhen a-share initial samples using Stata software of measurement, using correlation analysis, regression analysis and other quantitative statistical methods, emphasis on monetary compensation and management equity relationship with corporate performance, and according to the ultimate holding the empirical issue of executive compensation contracts effective utilization. After checking the following conclusions: (1) the management motivation, effectively enhance the value of the company, namely the monetary remuneration incentives and equity incentives have the same effect, is helpful to increase enterprise value. Get higher salary, management, the role of regulatory governance, better management, management and commercial interests more consistent, thereby helping to reduce unnecessary cost management opportunism. Relative concentration of listed companies, in this case, the big shareholders and small shareholders especially serious conflicts of interest. Moderate or equity incentive management, management can promote the effective supervision of large shareholders, to reduce the agency conflict. (2) can be considered the ultimate controlling shareholder control and company value is positive correla