practical_reasoning_in_a_modular_mind：模块化思维中的实践推理.pdf

Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind PETER CARRUTHERS Abstract: This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author’s previous work. This is that distinctively-human flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few a-modular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any significant retreat from a thesis of massively modular mental organization. 1. Introduction Can we explain, or make sense of, distinctively-human practical reasoning within a modular mental architecture? The question is worth asking, since there are good reasons for thinking that the human mind is massively modular in its organization. First, there is comparative, developmental, and neuro-pathological evidence that this is so (Shallice, 1988; Gallistel, 1990; Sperber et al., 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). Second, there are strong evolutionary and biological arguments for the conclusion that we should expect the mind to be modular (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). And third (and most importantly), minds must be modularly organized if they are to be computationally realized, since computations have to be modular if they are to be tractable (Fodor, 1983, 2000; Bryson, 2000; McDermott, 2001). Since the computationalist assumption is easily our best (and perhaps our only) hope for understanding how minds can be realized in physical brains (Rey, 1997), this gives us a powerful motive for believing in massive modularity. Rather than giving up on computational psychology for the foreseeable future (as Fodor, 2000, urges us