航空公司与酒店合作联盟的最优决策及收益分配机制分析-analysis on the optimal decision-making and revenue distribution mechanism of airline - hotel cooperation alliance.docx

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2018-05-26 发布于上海
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航空公司与酒店合作联盟的最优决策及收益分配机制分析-analysis on the optimal decision-making and revenue distribution mechanism of airline - hotel cooperation alliance.docx

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航空公司与酒店合作联盟的最优决策及收益分配机制分析-analysis on the optimal decision-making and revenue distribution mechanism of airline - hotel cooperation alliance

ABSTRACTABSTRACTThecurrenttourismmarketshowsawiderangeofnewfeatures:customers’diversifieddemand,tourismproducts/services’shortlifecycles,therapidexpansionofthenumberoftourismproduct/service,themoreandmorehighexpectationfortourismproductsandservices,saturationofthematuremarketandcustomers’uncertaindemand.Thesefactorsleadto“disturbancesofthemarket”toenhance.Traditionaloperationmodethatasingletourismenterprisemerelydependsonitsownresourceshasbeendifficulttoadapttothechangingrequirements.Theenterprisemustintegrateexternalresourcestoimplementationsupplychainmanagement,fromthemarketcompetitionofasingletourismenterprisetowardthemarketcompetitionbetweentourismsupplychains.Basedonthethoughtoftourismsupplychain“horizontalintegration”,mostdomesticandforeignairlinesandhotelsactivelyintegratethemownroutenetwork,salesnetworkandtheresourcesofdestination,andoptimizetheallocationofresources,create“Ticket+Room”value-addedproducts,exploitanewmarket.Thiscollaborationfashioncanachieveawin-win,evenmultiplewinsituations.However,thekeyofthecontinuouscooperationisthatairlineandhotelcanreachanagreementaboutrevenueallocation.Duetoairlineandhotelaretwodifferentstakeholders,theobjectivesofbotharetomaximizetheirowninterest,itisdifficulttoachieveconsensusonrevenueallocation,therebyresultinginlowefficiencyoftheleaguesystemandeventhebreakdownofthiscooperation.Thecoreofthisstudyistomaximizethetotalrevenueoftheleagueandtoimprovebothparties’revenueafterairlineandhotellaunch“Ticket+Room”travelpackages.Specifically,itistoseekanoptimalorderingquantityandanoptimalorderingpriceamongbothparties.Theoptimalorderingquantitydeterminesthetotalrevenueoftheleague,andtheoptimalorderingpriceisrelatedwithrevenueallocationbetweenairlineandhotel,whicharethekeyfactorsintheproblem.Onthebasisofstudyingtherelatedliteratureaboutrevenuemanagement,tourismABSTRACTsupplychainandsupplychainmanagement,thispaperisbasedontheideasofnon-cooperativegameandcooperativegametobuildquantitativeanalysismodelsofrevenueallocationunderthecondi