经理股票期权制度的内在缺陷及改进途径分析-analysis on the inherent defects and improvement ways of manager stock option system.docxVIP

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经理股票期权制度的内在缺陷及改进途径分析-analysis on the inherent defects and improvement ways of manager stock option system.docx

经理股票期权制度的内在缺陷及改进途径分析-analysis on the inherent defects and improvement ways of manager stock option system

ABSTRACTHowtosolvethecontradictioninprincipal-agentsystemsoastomotivateoperatorstotakepainstooperatecompaniesandreleasethemaximumvalueofhumancapitalisanimportantresearchsubjectofmoderncorporategovernance,inwhichhowtoformulatearationaloperatorincentiveandrestraintsystemisthecorecontent.TheExecutiveStockOption(ESO)isakindoflong-termcompensatoryincentivesystemwhichisdesignedtosolveincentiveandrestraintproblems.Theprincipal-agenttheory,thehumancapitaltheoryandthemodernenterprisetheoryprovidestheoreticalsupportforthedesignandimplementationoftheexecutivestockoptionsystem.TheESOsystemnotonlyrealizestheoperator’sinternalincentive,butalsorealizesthedynamicgamebetweenshareholdersandoperators,andembodiesthevalueofhumancapital,andsatisfiesthevalueaddeddemandofhumancapital,soithasstrongincentiveeffect.AccordingtoalltherealpracticeinESOincentive,itisadouble-edgedsword.Thereasonableuseofitwillbringpositiveeffectivenessinperfectingthecorporategovernancestructure,keepingthecoretalentsandpromotingcorporatevalue.Ontheotherhand,theundeserveduseofitwillbringgreatdamagetoenterprises,shareholdersandeventhesociety.CombiningtheESOtheoryandpracticeandbasedonthevalueconfirmingoftheESOsystem,thisthesisdiscussesemphaticallytheinternaldefectsoftheESOsystemanditsimprovingways,pointsoutthatthereexiststhreemajordefectsinthedesignofESOitselfwhichisthefundamentalcauseresultinginthegapbetweentheESOtheoryanditspracticaleffect.Thefirstistoevaluateandmotivatetheperformancebystockprice,namelysimpletakingstockpriceasevaluationindexestoevaluateoperator’sandenterprise’sperformance,anddecidingoperator’sincomebythestockmarketprice,whichwilldistorttheincentivesystembytheeffectofsystemelement.Thesecondistherisk-benefitasymmetry,namelyoperatorswillonlyreceiveawardandnopunishment.Thereisonlybenefitsharingbutnotrisksharing.Thethirdisthelackof“degree”inmotivation,namelylackofanobjective,fairandreasonableincentivestandardandscientificandreasonableperformanceevaluationindex,whichwillcausetheeasystockoptionsgrantedcond

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