战略联盟培训资料.pptVIP

II讲;（Qster 1994）An agreement in which two or more firms combine resources outside of the market in order to accomplish a particular task or set of tasks。 包括两层含义： 1）为了一件任务或一组任务而合作； 2）通过市场之外进行资源组合。（不通过市场进行交易）;; Theory of the firm: two ways to organize production – Market (contract) – Firm (merger) ? Strategic alliance is an organization form that lies between market and firm ? In an alliance resources are combined across organizations but the organizations themselves remain separate identities 既能得到企业的好处，又能避免完全成为一个企业带来的弊端，如，文化背景不同等。 ;;RD Alliances 在正的外部性存在的情况下，单独投资会使经济效率偏低，若将两企业合在一起，则使效率提高。（例如，苹果园与蜜蜂园） 在中国，产、学、研战略联盟成功的例子。校办企业的产生… ? Firms cooperate in RD spending and/or activities ? Two seminal papers: D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller and Zang 1992 ? Kamien et al is a generalization of D’Aspreomont and Jacquemin ;? In both models: ? Oligopolistic firms engage in RD ? RD has spillover effects ? Main conclusion: There is no uniform conclusion with regard to the effects of RD cooperation on RD spending. They depend on the size of spillovers as well as how RD cooperation is organized 结论是有争议的。 ;;分析三种情况: 1）没有合作 (“RD competition”) 2）仅 RD有合作 (“RD cartelization”) 3） RD与生产都有合作 (“monopoly”) ? Observations: ?由于存在正的溢出效应，在没有 RD合作的情况下，各个企业倾向于减少RD的投资。 ?在完全竞争产业，RD合作会提高 RD的总量。 ?但在寡头市场上，结果却不一定是这样。 这里考察的是寡头市场。 ;No Cooperation At stage 2 Each firm solves: The first-order condition: ? Solve the two first-order conditions to obtain the Cournot- Nash equilibrium (noting that xi and xj may take on different values): – Note that the effects of xj on qi depends on β ;At Stage 1 Each firm solves: Then Equilibrium solution: ? ? ? ? ?;Cooperation in RD Only Stage 2: The same as above Stage 1: The firms maximize the joint profit 考虑对称的情况 we obtain the following first-order condition: Then the equilibrium solution: ;Monopoly At stage 2 The monopolist maximizes joint profit: Focusing on the symmetric solution at x1 = x2 = x, we obtain: At Stage 1 T