毕业论文外文翻译-激励机制和奖励办法：竞争性招标在购与谈判.doc

外文原文1： Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement Steven Tadelis Patrick Bajari University of California Berkeley University of Michigan Haas School of Business Department of Economics January, 2006 Abstract Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we a framework that ?rst describes the buyer’s choice of contracts, and then links this choice to the selection of competitive tendering or negotiations. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of competitive tendering. These may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, competitive tendering may sti?e communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Implications of these results for procurement in the private and public sector are discussed. 1 Introduction Manufactured goods, such as computers, TVs and automobiles are mass produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list price. Other goods, such as new buildings, fighter jets, custom software or consulting services are tailored to?t a procurer’s specific and often unique needs. To procure these customized goods,the procurer hires a contractor who supplies the good according to a set of desired specifications. We call this the procurement problem. The procurement problem has attracted much attention both in policy and in academic circles. The main focus of academic economists has been on procurement by the public sector, in part because of its sheer importance to the economy.For example,procurement by federal, state and local government accounts for more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Pro