HILSHIALUNAINSGNIIVESIENE文档.pptVIP

PFCS 25/10/2004 PFCS * Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science Various ‘–isms’ 25/10/2004 PFCS * The ‘–isms’ Idealism Realism Dualism Interactionism Parallelism Epiphenomenalism Materialism Behaviourism Identity Theory Functionalism Machine, Conceptual, Role, Realiser 25/10/2004 PFCS * Idealism Idealism: “Esse est percipi”=“To be is to be perceived”, Berkeley The mental: Is more fundamental than the physical Is logically prior to the physical Cannot be explained in terms of the physical See also Kant, Hegel, etc. 25/10/2004 PFCS * Realism Realism: Real things just are things as philosophy/science/common sense takes them to be, respectively: Scholastic Realism Scientific Realism Na?ve Realism 25/10/2004 PFCS * Idealism vs. Realism Idealism vs. Realism What seems right about idealism is inherent in that we are constrained to use our own concepts in investigating the real What seems right about realism is that the answers to the questions we put to the real are provided by reality itself = Naturalised Empiricism (W.V.O.Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, “Epistemology Naturalized”): There are no theory independent observations Nevertheless, we can test our conceptual scheme against reality, and improve it 25/10/2004 PFCS * Materialism Materialism: A view corresponding to the rise of modern science Essentially, most of the positions that we will be considering in detail in this course are materialist: Behaviourism Identity Theory Functionalism To the extent that the mind can be known, it can be known to be a part of the material universe as understood by science Materialists can either be plain realists (of some sort) or Quinean empiricists 25/10/2004 PFCS * Dualism Descartes (1596-1650) was well aware of many early anatomical experiments Nevertheless, for Descartes Mind and Matter were separate types of stuff: “Res extensa” (extended stuff): Matter, with physical extension, and no conscious experience “Res cogitans” (thinking stuff): No physical extension, experi