THE PRICING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCEfor presen：企业定价提出governancefor.pptVIP

At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. * The essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and finance, or-in more standard terminology- of ownership and control. * Most corporate governance mechanisms used in the world-including large share holdings, relationship banking, and even takeovers- can be viewed as examples of large investors exercising their power. Despite its common use, concentrated ownership has its costs as well, which can be best described as potential expropriation by large investors of other investors and stakeholders in the firm. * If the market underestimated these additional costs, then a firm’s stock returns and operating performance would have been worse than expected, and the firm’s value at the beginning of the period would have been too high. * Having identified the subset of IRRC provisions that attracted substantial shareholder opposition, we also undertook our own legal and economic analysis of the possible significance of each of these six provisions. In conducting this analysis, we were informed and assisted by interviews we conducted with six highly prominent MA practitioners in six major corporate law firms. * * We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. * debt reduces the probability of a takeover. we also find some evidence that external mechanisms are more effective for small firms, suggesting that a larger firm size might reduce the quality of external governance (takeover vulnerability). * Jindra and Walkling (2004) show that offer prices are closer to market prices when there is a large price run-up prior t