产权性质、高管激励和投资效率-会计学专业论文.docxVIP

Ab Abstract 万方数据 万方数据 Abstract Investment decision-making is the core of enterprise financial management, it directly affects and decides the survival and development of enterprises. In recent years, total fixed asset investment increased year by year in China, and the investment efficiency has decreased year by year, the inefficient investment problem is becoming more and more serious, which not only damages the value of the company also hinders the long-term development of the enterprise. Based on the existence of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers management, managers at information superiority will be easy to access the relevant investment information than shareholders at information inferior, and lead managers to damage the interests of shareholders to maximize their own interests. Because of the principal-agent problem, there are conflicts of interest between enterprise owners and management, some starting motivation of the investment decision-making from executives is not to increase the market value of the enterprise or to maximize of shareholders’ interests, but from their own benefits, to obtain the invisible income and welfare through the inefficiency investment, increase their own resources and wealth, therefore, there is no close correlation between execution the investment decision and the growth opportunities of corporate. Effective incentive mechanism not only can mitigate agency-problems caused by the separation of ownership and management rights, but also motivate executives to pursue the maximum of profit. In this paper, researching the incentive effect on the efficiency of investment, we put the nature of property right in the ranks of empirical research？. According to the difference of actual controllers, Chinas listed Corporation is divided into state-owned companies and private enterprises ,state-controlled enterprises is further divided into the central government owned enterprises and municipal government owned enterpri