房屋买卖居间合同中双边道德风险的法律规制民商法学专业论文.docxVIP

Abstract With the rapid development of the real estate market in China，the intermediate exercise of second-hand house trade become more frequent than before. Housing intermediator is developing in the direction of specialization and professionalization. Moral hazard in the performance of such contracts refer to the possible impairments of benefits done to one contractual party by the other， who takes advantage of the information asymmetry between the two parties. In the case of information asymmetry, moral hazard are not exclusively taken by one contractual party. At any time and under any circumstance, both parties have opportunities to utilize their advantages in the information asymmetry. This is what is called bilateral moral hazard. Examples in practice is increasingly confirmed this issue. The Contract Law of the PRC, based on the assumption that only the intermediator has the chance to materialize moral hazard, tendentiously imposes more obligations on the intermediator than on the client, intensifying the inequality in information and status possessed by the two parties, which violates principles of equality and justice respected by the Contract Law. In reality, clients are also capable of materializing moral risks in the performance of intermediary housing contract. In some cases, clients’ dishonest conducts in performing contracts can result in the impairment of intermediators’ benefits. To avoid the double moral hazard in the performance of intermediary housing sale contract, efforts should be made in eliminating the information asymmetry, maintaining the fairness in benefits distribution and ensuring the justice in stipulating legal rights and obligations of contractual parties. This article is divided into four parts. The first part indicates that the uncertainty of the payment and the payment obligation of the mandator is conditioned, this two aspects in contract of mediate, by analysis of the law construction of the contract of mediate which reflects